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Robots, Regulation, and the Changing Nature of Public Space
Kristen Thomasen

Robots are an increasingly common
feature in North American public spaces.
From regulations permitting broader
drone use in public airspace and autonomous vehicle testing on public roads,
to delivery robots roaming sidewalks in
major US cities, to the announcement
of Sidewalk Toronto — a plan to convert
waterfront space in one of North America’s largest cities into a robotics-filled
smart community — the laws regulating
North American public spaces are opening up to robots.
In many of these examples, the
growing presence of robots in public
space is associated with opportunities to improve human lives through
intelligent urban design, environmental
efficiency, and greater transportation
accessibility. However, the introduction
of robots into public space has also
raised concerns about, for example: the
commercialization of these spaces by the
companies that deploy robots; increasing surveillance that will negatively
impact physical and data privacy; or the
potential marginalization or exclusion
of some members of society in favour
of those who can pay to access, use, or
support the new technologies available
in these spaces.
Laws that permit, regulate, or
prohibit robotic systems in public
spaces will in many ways determine
how this new technology impacts public
space and the people who inhabit that
space. This begs the questions: how
should regulators approach the task

Les robots sont de plus en plus
présents dans les espaces publics
nord-américains. De la réglementation
autorisant davantage de drones dans
l’espace aérien public, aux essais de
véhicules autonomes sur les routes
publiques, aux robots livreurs qui parcourent les trottoirs des grandes villes
aux États-Unis, à l’annonce de Sidewalk
Toronto — un plan visant à convertir le
secteur riverain d’une des plus grandes
villes d’Amérique du Nord, en communauté intelligente remplie de robots — les
lois régissant les espaces publics
nord-américains s’ouvrent aux robots.
Dans plusieurs de ces exemples, la
présence grandissante de robots dans
l’espace public est associée aux possibilités d’amélioration de la vie humaine
à travers un aménagement urbain
intelligent, une efficacité environnementale et une meilleure accessibilité des
transports. Cependant, l’introduction
de robots dans les espaces publics a
également suscité des inquiétudes. Par
exemple, la commercialisation de ces
espaces par les entreprises qui déploient
les robots, l’augmentation de la surveillance ayant des répercussions négatives
sur la vie privée et la confidentialité des
données, ou encore, le risque de marginalisation ou d’exclusion de certains
membres de la société en faveur de ceux
et celles pouvant payer pour accéder,
utiliser ou appuyer les nouvelles technologies disponibles dans ces espaces.
Les lois qui autorisent, réglementent
ou interdisent les systèmes robotiques
275

of regulating robots in public spaces?
And should any special considerations
apply to the regulation of robots because
of the public nature of the spaces they
occupy? This paper argues that the laws
that regulate robots deployed in public
space will affect the public nature of
that space, potentially to the benefit of
some human inhabitants of the space
over others. For these reasons, special considerations should apply to the
regulation of robots that will operate
in public space. In particular, the entry
of a robotic system into a public space
should never be prioritized over communal access to and use of that space
by people. And, where a robotic system
serves to make a space more accessible,
lawmakers should avoid permitting
differential access to that space through
the regulation of that robotic system.
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dans les espaces publics détermineront à bien des égards l’impact qu’aura
cette nouvelle technologie sur l’espace
public et les personnes qui y vivent.
Cela soulève les questions suivantes :
comment les autorités doivent-elles
aborder la réglementation des robots
dans les espaces publics ? Et, devrait-on
appliquer des considérations particulières à la réglementation des robots à
cause de la nature publique des espaces
qu’ils occupent ? Cet article soutient
que les lois qui régissent les robots
déployés dans un espace public affecteront le caractère public de cet espace,
potentiellement en faveur de certains
humains plus que d’autres. Pour ces
raisons, des considérations particulières
doivent s’appliquer à la réglementation
des robots qui circuleront dans l’espace
public. Plus précisément, l’introduction
d’un système robotique dans un espace
public ne doit jamais être priorisée par
rapport à l’accès commun à cet espace et
à son utilisation par des êtres humains.
Et lorsqu’un système robotique vise à
rendre un espace plus accessible, les
autorités législatives doivent éviter d›autoriser un accès différentiel à cet espace
par l’entremise de la réglementation de
ce système robotique.
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Robots, Regulation, and the Changing
Nature of Public Space
Kristen Thomasen*

INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly common to find robots in North American public spaces.1
Advances in technology are making complex interactions between robotic
systems and humans possible in unpredictable urban settings. Meanwhile,
*

1

Assistant Professor of Law, Robotics & Society, University of Windsor; PhD Candidate,
University of Ottawa. My gratitude goes out to John Popham, Alex Mogyoros, Sujith
Xavier, and Katie Szilagyi for comments on earlier drafts; to Sujith Xavier and Jeffrey Hewitt for helping me think through ideas at early stages of the paper; and to Nicole Gilewicz
for sending along helpful articles in the early stages of this paper. A sincere thank you to
Woodrow Hartzog and the participants of We Robot, 2018, the McGill AI and Law Speaker
Series, the University of Toronto Ethics of AI in Context Speaker Series, as well as the
Ottawa Law Review editorial staff, and three blind reviewers for thoughtful comments and
questions that deepened and improved my thinking in this paper. Special thanks also to
my research assistants Tiffanny Ing, Shahrouz Shoghian, and Joanna Pawlowski for their
willingness and ability to find anything under the sun. And my deepest gratitude goes out
to my incomparable mentor, teacher, and PhD supervisor, Dr. Ian Kerr, who helped me
find my path and then supported me every step along the way.
This paper adopts a broad definition of “robot” as any embodied (i.e. physical) technology,
that takes in information from its surrounding environment, processes that information,
and acts upon that information (with varying degrees of automation and human input),
roughly applying the “sense-think-act” paradigm. In terms of public space, this paper also
adopts a broad definition as any space over which there is no private-property based legal
right to exclude. Quasi-public private spaces — like private malls, grocery stores, or promenades — might raise some of the same concerns discussed throughout this paper, but are
often subject to different sets of rules and values based on their private-ownership, and
so these are excluded. This analysis is limited to focusing on robots in Canadian public
spaces in the backdrop of Canadian common and statutory law. Further thinking and
discussion of the broader impacts of robots in and on other legal systems not considered
here will complement and expand the discussion in this paper.
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the laws regulating use and access to public spaces are opening up to
robots.2 This paper explores the impact that robots and robot regulation
will have on the public nature of public spaces. It argues that lawmakers
need to be careful and explicit about how they regulate robotic systems
that operate in public spaces, because by regulating robots, lawmakers can
render a space more or less public to individuals and communities.
Often, the presence of robots in public space is justified as an opportunity to improve human lives through intelligent urban design, environmental efficiency, and greater access to transportation and public space.
There are many ways in which robots can increase the public’s use of,
and access to, public spaces. Remoteness from a human operator might
enable access to otherwise hard to reach places. For instance, drone technology has made access to public airspace practical for a range of stakeholders.3 Automation can generate new ways of accessing and using space.
For example, autonomous vehicles could allow persons with disabilities
to access transit in new ways that can enhance personal autonomy and
dignity.4 Technologies can be designed to overcome barriers in the existing built environment. Research teams, for instance, have been working

2

3

4

Aviation regulations are permitting broader drone use in public airspace, and city bylaws
allow delivery robots to roam the sidewalks of major United States (US) cities. New road
regulations mean that autonomous shuttles and buses can transport people through urban
downtowns. These changing road rules are turning cities into test-sites for autonomous
car developers. Public-private partnerships are converting city neighbourhoods into robotics-filled smart communities, like Sidewalk Toronto, a partnership between Alphabet Inc.,
the Governments of Canada and Ontario, and the City of Toronto. Sidewalk Toronto proposes to convert waterfront space in one of North America’s largest cities into an AI- and
robotics-driven smart city. These are just a handful of the growing number of examples of
robotic systems entering into public spaces. The sections below canvass some of the more
common, more developed, or more controversial examples of the many systems that are
in development, testing, or use. This is not intended as a comprehensive canvassing of all
potentially relevant technologies. Each system will raise its own legal issues, along with
some common issues related to the public space where it is operating — this paper focuses
on the latter.
See e.g. Kristen Thomasen, “Flying Between the Lines: Drone Laws and the (Re)Production of Public Spaces” in Eric Hilgendorf & Uwe Seidel, eds, Robotics, Autonomics, and the
Law: Legal Issues Arising From the AUTONOMICS for Industry 4.0 Technology Programme of
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017)
205 [Thomasen, “Flying Between”].
See Fahad Khan, Krzysztof Czarnecki, Kristen Thomasen & Laverne Jacobs, “Accessibility
in Autonomous Vehicle Policy” (Panel delivered at the University of Windsor Faculty of
Law, 14 February 2018)[Thomasen & Jacobs, “Accessibility”].
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on using robots to improve the physical accessibility of public spaces.5 To
the extent that robotics can reduce some of the barriers created by the
built environment of a public space, the technology would serve to make
that space more public.6
However, the introduction of robots into public space has also raised
concerns about, for example: the commercialization of these spaces by the
companies that deploy robots; increasing surveillance that will negatively
impact physical and data privacy; militarization of public space through
state adoption of robotic systems designed for war-time use; and the
potential exclusion of vulnerable members of society in favour of those
who can pay to access, use, or support the new technologies available in
these spaces.7 The physical intrusiveness and data collection associated
with robots can have differential impacts on individuals occupying these
spaces, particularly for already privacy-vulnerable populations including
visible minorities, women, and people experiencing homelessness.8 In
5

See “Being There: Humans & Robots in Public Spaces” (21 November 2018), online: Being
There <web.archive.org/web/20181121121521/http://being-there.org.uk/> (the Being There project explored how robots can enable participation in public); Michael Baker & Holly Yanco,
“Automated Street Crossing for Assistive Robots” (Paper delivered at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 9th International Conference on Rehabilitation Robotics,
Chicago, 28 June 2005), online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1501081>. Researchers of
the DALI Project are developing a robotic cognitive walker (c-Walker) that can be taken to,
or picked up at, a destination. The device is meant to take corrective actions when the user
comes across the type of busy area, obstacle, or incident they want to avoid. See CORDIS,
“Robot Walker for Elderly People in Public Spaces” (22 May 2015), online: PhysOrg <phys.org/
news/2015-05-robot-walker-elderly-people-spaces.html>. See also Ruth Butler & Sophia
Bowlby, “Bodies and Spaces: An Exploration of Disabled People’s Experiences of Public
Space” (1997) 15:4 Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 411 (“one element of the difficulties faced by many disabled people is the design of the built environment — the places
and spaces in which social life occurs … so-called public space is often inaccessible or difficult for disabled people to enter and move easily and freely within” at 421).
6 To date, many of these robots are in the earlier phases of testing and development, and
have not yet been deployed in public spaces.
7 See e.g. April Glaser, “San Francisco Is Considering Legislation That Would Ban Sidewalk
Delivery Robots”, Recode (16 May 2017), online: <vox.com/2017/5/16/15648324/san-franciscolegislation-ban-autonomous-delivery-robots-sidewalks>. More generally with regard to
smart cities, see Shruti Ravindran, “Is India’s 100 Smart Cities Project a Recipe for Social
Apartheid?”, The Guardian (7 May 2015), online: <theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/07/
india-100-smart-cities-project-social-apartheid >; Eva Blum-Dumontet, “Smart Cities: Better
for Whom?” (31 October 2017), online: Privacy International <medium.com/@privacyint/
smart-cities-better-for-whom-b9abec9cec44>.
8 These are of course not mutually exclusive identities. In many ways, particularly as a result
of regulation, policing, and surveillance, access to and use of public space can, in practice,
be, for example, gendered and racialized. See e.g. Kristen Thomasen, “Beyond Airspace
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other words, the introduction of robotic systems in public space could
alternatively (or simultaneously) render the space less public9 to some
individuals or communities. Restrictions on who can use robotic systems
within public spaces can have the further effect of making the same space
simultaneously accessible to some and not to others. An example of this
arose recently when the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) instituted differential regulation of the use of drones over protests, where protestors and some journalists were prohibited from using the technology to
access information about police activities on the ground below — including police brutality — while police were permitted to use the technology to
surveil protestors.10
In the examples referred to above, the presence and use of robots in
public space was precipitated and regulated through law. In some cases,
laws had to be passed or changed to allow operators to deploy robots in
public spaces, and in other cases, laws had to be adopted to prevent the
use of robots in public space.11 The laws that permit, regulate, or prohibit
robotic systems in public spaces will in many ways determine how this
new technology impacts the space and the people who inhabit that space.12

9
10
11

12

Safety: A Feminist Perspective on Drone Privacy Regulation” (2018) 16:2 CJLT 307, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3143655&download=yes>.
As in, open, accessible, usable. Part I, below, expands on this concept.
This example is elaborated upon in Part II, below.
This is not meant to overlook the likelihood that some companies will proceed to test or
deploy robots in public without explicitly permissive regulations, as has happened in the
past including, for example, with Uber. See Alex Davies, “Uber’s Robo-Car Test in SF is
a Middle Finger to Regulators”, Wired (14 December 2016), online: <wired.com/2016/12/
legal-loophole-lets-uber-test-self-driving-cars-california>; Drone Business Centre, “Proof
that Autonomous Disobedience Pays” (30 November 2016), online: <dronebusiness.center/
proving-that-autonomous-disobedience-pays-13104>. But this does not change the relevance of considering how to approach regulation because: a) in many cases there is still
regulation first; and b) often where companies go ahead without regulatory permission,
regulation eventually follows.
The regulation of robots is interesting especially because they are expected to become prolific. A prime example of another, similarly transformative technology that reconfigured
cities and prompted a range of laws restricting or reorganizing what were once common
public activities, was the automobile. It is not uncommon for developers and some regulators to compare the dramatic change that robotic systems will bring to public space to that
of the car. This expected impact even more so encourages a critical evaluation of who will
experience the benefits of such transformation, and at what expense. See generally Mark
S Foster, A Nation on Wheels: The Automobile Culture in America Since 1945 (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003); James J Flink, The Car Culture (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1975); Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American
City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). For pedestrians, cyclists, and horse-
riders, see generally James J Flink, America Adopts the Automobile, 1895–1910, (Cambridge,
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This begs the questions: how should regulators approach the task of regulating robots in public spaces? And should any special considerations
apply to the regulation of these robots because of the public nature of the
spaces they occupy?
This paper focuses on answering these questions. It argues that the
laws that regulate robots deployed in public space will affect the public
nature of that space, potentially to the benefit of some human inhabitants
of the space over others.13 For instance, rules designed to protect robots
from damage, to create space for robots, or to purportedly protect individuals from potential harm caused by robots, can all impact how different individuals and communities get to use and enjoy public space. These
rules could have the effect of making the space more or less public for different users of that space. For these reasons, this paper argues that special
considerations should apply to the regulation of robots that will operate
in public space. The paper ultimately proposes two basic principles that
should inform the regulation of robots in public spaces: (a) the entry of a
robotic system into a public space should never be prioritized over human
access to and use of that space; and (b) where a robotic system serves
to make a space more accessible, lawmakers must be cautious to avoid
providing differential access to that space through the regulation of the
robotic system. Foundationally, lawmakers should resist any arguments
by users or manufacturers of robotic systems that public space — by virtue of its public nature — must be freely available for the use of robotics.
MA: MIT Press, 1970); Carol Sanger, “Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space” in Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard T Ford, eds,
The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 31.
13 There has been prior academic consideration of what it means to put robots in public
space, but by my research of English-language publications, this is the first paper to suggest a framework for considering how the space in which the robots operate should affect
their regulation and how those regulations affect the space within which these robots
are operating. These are important considerations that the paper argues need to be more
explicitly considered at the time of regulation: <robots.law.miami.edu/2014/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/Asaro-Micro-Airspaces.pdf>. See also Oliver Bendel, “Service Robots in
Public Spaces”, Telepolis (25 June 2017), online: <heise.de/tp/features/Service-Robots-inPublic-Spaces-3754173.html?seite=all>; Guangda Zhang, Hai-Ning Liang & Yong Yue, “An
Investigation of the Use of Robots in Public Spaces” (Paper delivered at the 2015 IEEE
International Conference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent Systems, Shenyang, 8 June 2015), online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7288055>;
Mason Marks, “Robots in Space: Sharing Our World with Autonomous Delivery Vehicles”
(Paper delivered at We Robot, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, 12
April 2019) [unpublished], online: <robots.law.miami.edu/2019/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/Mason-Marks-Robots-in-Space-WeRobot-2019-3-14.pdf>.

283

284

Revue de droit d’Ottawa

•

51:2 | Ottawa Law Review

•

51:2

Such an approach threatens to privatize and commercialize public spaces
in ways that would potentially exclude people and undermine many of the
values associated with public space, including community, sociality, and
democracy.
The rest of the paper proceeds in three parts. The first part takes a
deeper look at the intersection of law, public space, and its inhabitants;
examining the concept of public space and explaining how robot regulation will have the effect of shaping or changing the public nature of space.
To do this, Part I introduces the interdisciplinary field of law and geography, which focuses on exposing the intersections between law, society,
and space. In particular, this part explains how laws that regulate the use
or protection of robotics could have the effect of making space more or
less public for different people. Accordingly, this paper argues that when
lawmakers and regulators are dealing with robotic systems that operate in
public spaces, the public location of the system should inform how these
systems are regulated.
However, there is no one common legal or policy vision of what public
space is and how it should be regulated. Part II draws on the theory introduced in the first section to examine different legal visions of how a public
space can be understood, and considers how these visions of public space
influence lawmakers and courts to regulate access to, use of, and rights
within that space. In other words, it considers the different ways in which
the “public” designation of the space where robots operate might shape
the laws regulating those systems. Part II also considers how these different visions might have the effect (intended or not) of excluding particular
people or communities from public space, through different notions of
the legitimate uses or purposes of that space.
The paper concludes in Part III by arguing that, if we want public spaces
to serve communal, social, and democratic functions, then the introduction of robots into spaces that are legally designated as “public” should
never prioritize robotic systems over the people who use or wish to use
these spaces. Where the technology can enhance public access to, and use
of, physical public spaces, lawmakers should avoid permitting differential
access to, and use of, that space through robot regulation.
This paper has some necessary parameters.14 The paper specifically considers urban robotic technologies; that is, robots that are being designed,
at least for now, for deployment within urban areas (e.g. delivery and
14 Each of which is important — these are not listed in any order of significance.

Robots, Regulation, and the Changing Nature of Public Space

security robots, people-moving robots, etc). While the same autonomous
systems might be deployed in rural areas, wilderness, or ocean spaces,
this paper considers how the technology is being developed and tested
for use predominantly in cities.15 Where robotic systems are first tested
in urban spaces, both the benefits and the complications associated with
these technologies will affect city-dwellers first. These technologies are
also being deployed and tested in areas where many individuals have limited access to private spaces. This results in a different reliance on shared
public spaces than may exist in rural areas.16
Additionally, this paper focuses on robots as opposed to exclusively
computer-based automated systems. Because of the embodied nature
of robotic technology — the physical space the technology takes up, the
physical impact it can have on individuals who share that space, and
the impact it can have on the infrastructure of the space where it is
deployed — the physicality of robots can affect human experience in particular ways.17 This physicality raises considerations for law and policy,
urban design, and human-robot interaction that are relevant to the impact
of the technology on public spaces, and may be distinct from the issues
raised by computer-based artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Of course,
many of these considerations will also overlap; but this paper does not
devote itself to figuring out when or how that overlap will take place.18
Many of the considerations in this paper will also apply to non-robotic
technologies. This paper focuses on robotic systems (and not other technologies) for two primary reasons: (a) some features of robots raise novel
challenges to public space and regulation — e.g. robotic technologies can
be used to access new spaces, and to access and use existing spaces in
different ways by different people or companies;19 and (b) robotic systems
are expected to be prolific and are already entering into urban spaces,
capturing the attention of lawmakers and the public alike. These systems
prompt a need and an opportunity to consider the ways in which the regulations of things can have broader social implications. This conversation
15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze specific distinctions between municipal
public space, so called “Crown land”, or other forms of public space “ownership”.
16 Of course, cities are not the only places where people rely on shared or communal space.
Many of the same considerations might apply in other communal spaces, though these are
not explicitly considered in this paper.
17 See Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513.
18 This paper also does not focus on spatial considerations associated with augmented reality,
though some overlapping issues may arise.
19 There are examples of each throughout the paper. See also Calo, supra note 17.
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is urgent with respect to robots, but not disconnected from other debates
about urban public space and regulation; though these latter debates are
beyond the scope of this paper.
Significantly, this paper deals with laws and concepts, like public space
and its regulation, that are colonial constructs, which also engage stolen
and occupied lands in Canada and the US.20 I recognize and struggle with
the reality that this paper deals with the status quo — only addressing laws
and robotic systems within the current Canadian legal system. Addressing
the colonial impact of law on public space requires much more than a narrow discussion of robotics regulation, up to and including actual return
of occupied lands, as well as greater self-reflective and reflexive practice
amongst academics, law- and policy-makers, and manufacturers.21 In this
paper, I hope to at least reject the idea that public spaces — so designated
according to the Canadian legal system — are “there for the taking” by
those with the power and technology to do so, be it the state, commercial
enterprise, or private individuals. I hope to reject the approach taken by
some robotics companies that commercial enterprise is entitled to make
profitable use of public spaces. I certainly do not intend to romanticize
public space — to prioritize access to it over pre-existing claims to the
lands at issue, or challenges to the construct of a space as public space.
This paper only touches on a small part of a much larger conversation
and research agenda about how to address emerging robotic systems, and
about how to conceptualize and treat the spaces that these systems currently or might soon occupy.

20 This paper focuses on Canadian urban spaces in regard to law and regulation, however
it draws on many examples from the US. This is due, in large part, to the fact that more
robotic systems have been deployed for testing and use in the US, though certainly many
are being tested in Canada as well. The examples from the US also better highlight some
of the issues discussed in this paper. Many of the robotic systems deployed in the US
are apt to come to Canada, or already have, and therefore these examples are relevant as
hypotheticals for the Canadian experience.
21 See Eve Tuck & K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1; Yellowhead Institute, “Land Back: A Yellowhead
Institute Red Paper” (October 2019), online (pdf): <redpaper.yellowheadinstitute.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/red-paper-report-final.pdf>; Jeffery G Hewitt “Land Acknowledgement, Scripting and Julius Caesar” (2019) 88 SCLR 27; S Xavier, J Hewitt, A Alvez, A
Bhatia, B Jacobs & V Waboose, Decolonizing Law in the Global North and Global South (Routledge, forthcoming). See specifically, S. Xavier and J Hewitt’s “Introduction” for more
regarding the process of reflectivity and reflexivity.
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Finally, this paper deals with public space as a singular concept, but
public spaces are not all the same.22 People will have different reasons for
accessing different spaces, and will use those spaces for different activities. For example, protests typically take place in city squares, streets, and
on sidewalks in order to gain the attention of others, rather than in a quiet
city park. Parks might be a place for respite away from busy public streets.
Sidewalks are a safer place to congregate than a public road.23 Eliminating
conduct from one public space might have the effect of prohibiting that
conduct altogether, if it cannot be logically carried out elsewhere. Public space is not a uniform concept — nevertheless, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to carry out an analysis of various types of public spaces.
Of course, closer consideration of a particular space will be needed when
regulating robotic systems, but can be guided by the broad principles
examined in this paper.
I. LAW & GEOGRAPHY, AND ROBOTS
A. Introduction
This section considers how the regulation of a robotic system can impact
the public nature of a physical space. To ground this analysis, Part I turns
to scholarship from the interdisciplinary field of law and geography. The
sub-sections below introduce law and geography and some of what it says
about the intersection between law and public space. In particular, law
and geography’s nuanced understanding of what public space is, and how
it is defined by more than its legal property status, can generate a deeper
understanding and assessment of the impact of robotics regulations on
public spaces. These ideas from law and geography are then drawn upon
in Part II to examine how lawmakers can affect public space through the
regulation of robotic systems.

22 Public-private partnerships to establish smart cities, like Sidewalk Toronto, will complicate this distinction even further. See also John Page, “Explainer: What Is Public Space
and Why Does It Need Protecting” (31 December 2019), online: The Conversation
<theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-public-space-and-why-does-it-need-protecting121692>.
23 For a compelling discussion about the norms of particular places and spaces in relation to
augmented reality, see Elizabeth F Judge & Tenille E Brown, “Pokémorials: Placing Norms
in Augmented Reality” (2017) 50:4 UBC L Rev 971.
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B. The Intersection of Law, Space, and Robots
The interdisciplinary field of law and geography explores the reciprocal
relationships between law, space, and society, guided by a central proposition that law co-creates space and space co-creates law.24 Specifically
helpful to this analysis of robotics regulation, the field has examined how
the notion of public space is produced through law and regulation, and
how the public nature of space influences law.25 In particular, law and
geography scholars have emphasized that simply designating a space as
“public” (or not private) in law does not, on its own, render that space
public for everyone, or in some cases for anyone.26 For a space to be public, members of the public must be able to identify it as such, and must
be able to access and use the space.27 Similarly, the physical qualities of a
space — such as being physically open and accessible to members of the
public — do not alone determine whether a space is a “public” space. A
shopping centre could feel public to those seeking to enter, but it is legally
designated as private property and its owners have a private propertybased right to exclude.28 To actually be a “public” space, the space also
24 Law and property scholar Antonia Layard’s personal website provides clear explanations
of some central concepts. See Antonia Layard, “What is Legal Geography?”, online: Law,
Property, Place <antonialayard.com/what-is-legal-geography/> [Layard, “What is Legal Geography”]. See also the remaining footnotes in this sub-section for further academic writing.
25 Parts of this discussion of law and geography draw from an earlier paper of mine. See
Thomasen, “Flying Between”, supra note 3. See also Nicholas Blomley, “Law, Property and
the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid” (2003) 93:1 Annals
Assoc American Geographers 121; David Delaney, “Beyond the Word: Law As a Thing of
This World” in Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, eds, Law and Geography, 5th ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003) 67.
26 Some public-owned government buildings, for example, are entirely off limits to members
of the public.
27 Antonia Layard, “Freedom of Expression and Spatial (Imaginations of ) Justice” in Dimitry
Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca & Andrew Williams, eds, Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2015) 417 at 424 [Layard, “Freedom of Expression”]. The status of a space
as public can be derived through reference to different qualities of the space: the features
of the space, social norms associated with the space, etc. See also Henri Lefebvre, The
Production of Space, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
2000); Susan Ruddick, “Constructing Difference in Public Spaces” (1996) 17:2 Urban
Geography 132; Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public
Space, (New York: Guilford Press, 2003); Evelyn S Ruppert, “Rights to Public Space: Regulatory Reconfigurations of Liberty” (2006) 27:3 Urban Geography 271.
28 Such spaces can be regulated at least largely — if not fully — by the private owner. See Layard, “Freedom of Expression”, supra note 27 at 5. See also Harrison v Carswell [1976] 2 SCR
200, 62 DLR (3d) 68; Ruppert, supra note 27; Michael Sorkin, ed, Variations on a Theme
Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).
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requires a legal status that permits public use, and the protections that
flow from that.29
Beyond the legal status of a space, as public or private for instance, the
regulatory regimes that apply within that space may also determine the
public nature of the space.30 Regulations that exclude some people from
the space, prohibit certain conduct or activities within the space, permit
certain designs of space or objects within that space, or permit forms of
policing and surveillance,31 can all have the effect of rendering a public
space less public; to the extent that it is not as accessible or open to all
members of a community in the same way.32 This can mean that different
individuals experience the same space as either public or private/exclusionary, despite a common legal designation of the space as “public.”
For this very reason, Professor Evelyn Ruppert argues that what is
really at issue when one tries to establish if a space is public, are the “regulatory practices that configure liberty — that is, rights to public space and
who and what belong as part of the public.”33 In order to understand public space as a collective space, she adds, “we must examine how it is constituted by regulatory practices.”34

29

30
31
32

33
34

Koops and Galič discuss the growing privatization and securitization of public space. See
Bert-Jaap Koops & Maša Galič, “Conceptualizing Space and Place: Lessons From Geography for the Debate on Public Privacy” in Tjerk Timan, Bryce Clayton Newell & BertJaap Koops, eds, Privacy in Public Space: Conceptual and Regulatory Challenges (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar, 2017) 19 at 33–35; Anne Bottomley, “A Trip to the Mall: Revisiting the
Public/Private Divide” in Hilary Lim & Anne Bottomley, eds, Feminist Perspectives on Land
Law, (Abingdon, UK: Cavendish, 2007) 65.
Layard, “Freedom of Expression”, supra note 27 at 6. See also Antonia Layard, “Public
Space: Property, Lines, Interruptions” (2016) 2:1 JL Property & Society 1 [Layard, “Public
Space”]. Drawing from Layard’s compelling arguments in the latter piece, I am mindful that
legal status alone does not make space “public” and often might just serve to determine
who has the authority over the space, including the authority to regulate and to exclude.
Mitchell, supra note 27.
Hille Koskela, “‘The Gaze Without Eyes’: Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of
Urban Space” (2000) 24:2 Progress in Human Geography 243.
Ruppert, supra note 27. Nicholas Blomley, “Public Space: Introduction” in Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard T Ford, eds, The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and
Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 3 [Blomley, “Public Space”].
Ruppert, supra note 27 at 271.
Ibid at 273. “While many social and political activities that make up public life occur in
public spaces, these are enabled and constrained by a variety of practices (laws, regulations, urban design, surveillance, and policing). Collectively these constitute a regulatory
regime … [I]n order to understand public space as a collective good we must examine how
it is constituted by regulatory practices” (ibid at 272–73). Ruppert in fact defines public
space as “that object which is constituted not by ownership but by a regime made up of
regulatory practices” (ibid at 273).
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In other words, public space can lose its configuration as a space for
the public though regimes with a limited view of who constitutes the
“public,” or of who, and what (including robots), belong in that space. 35
For example, while a space like a public park might be legally designated as
public, and physically open to the public, regulation of particular conduct
within the park can have the effect of excluding specific people from that
space. For example, Professor Don Mitchell has looked at how restrictions
on activities like sleeping and loitering in public spaces can particularly
target individuals experiencing homelessness, who have less access to private spaces in which to carry out these activities.36 These regulations can
result in surveillance, criminalization, and eviction from the space.
Professor Nicholas Blomley has also examined how the regulation of
public sidewalks can exclude individuals from that public space. When
regulators focus on the flow and efficiency of the sidewalk, anyone or anything that stands in the way of smooth circulation might be regulated away.
For example, Blomley points out that in law, an individual who is panhandling on a public sidewalk may be treated the same way as a physical
obstruction like a newspaper box — regulated against and removed to
enhance the use of the sidewalk for efficient public transit.37 An analysis
of the “public” nature of space must accordingly focus on the role of lawmakers and courts in regulating that space, rather than solely focusing on
the property-ownership status of the space.38
Legal geographers also highlight ways that public space can simultaneously have the effect of shaping law. For example, lawmakers might base
35 Ibid at 273. “What is at issue in assertions about the decline of public space is that this
regulatory regime is reconfiguring liberty — that is, rights to public space — through a
change in the conception of the public, of who and what belong as part of that public”
(ibid at 273).
36 Mitchell suggests that “anti-homelessness laws” serve to constrain behavior and space
with the result that homeless people cannot carry out necessary life and survival activities without breaking the law (Mitchell, supra note 27). Laws targeting individuals
experiencing homelessness will have disproportionate impacts on already marginalized
people, including Indigenous people who are overrepresented among people experiencing
homelessness in Canada. See Stephen Gaetz et al, “The State of Homelessness in Canada”
(2016), online (pdf): The Homeless Hub <homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC16_final_
20Oct2016.pdf>.
37 Nicholas Blomley, Rights of Passage: Sidewalks and the Regulation of Public Flow (New York:
Taylor & Francis, 2010) [Blomley, Rights of Passage].
38 Ruppert, supra note 27 at 273. Ruppert concludes we may need to “turn our attention
away from resources, spaces and goods as constituting public space to that of regulatory
regimes and in this way bring to the fore the state’s role in regulation rather than in the
direct provision and ownership of public space” (ibid at 273).
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their approach to regulation — and who, and what, should be prioritized
in public space — on their particular vision of what makes a public space
public. These considerations will in turn determine if a legally public space
is accessible to different members of the public for different activities and
conduct. Several different visions of public space, and what these legal
visions mean for robotics regulation and the public spaces where robots
operate, are discussed at greater length in Part II.
Accordingly, a public space emerges from the relationship between: (a)
the physical characteristics of the space (which may include the presence
or absence of robotic technology); (b) the legal status of the space, determining who has the authority to use, or to permit members of the public
to use, that space; and (c) the rules that regulate conduct, activities, and
infrastructure within the space (including laws that regulate the presence,
use of, and human-interaction with robotic systems). Through this lens, a
public space will simultaneously embody legal, spatial, and social significance.39 Consequently, all three of these factors must feed into an analysis
of the impact of robots on the spaces where they operate — a crucial lesson from law and geography that will be carried into the next Part.
This approach to understanding public space encourages thinking
about space as a mechanism of social relations, rather than as a “fixed,
natural and objective” thing.40 It avoids an oversimplified definition of
public space as based solely on legal property status. This view encourages
a focus on how the laws that regulate robots, that regulate human interactions with robots, and the robotic systems themselves, might change
the open and accessible nature of public spaces, and what this means for
the public, especially those members of the public who could be excluded
from these spaces.
A recent example to flesh out the above discussion of how robots and
robot regulations can change the public nature of a space involves the
use and regulation of drones in airspace. Airspace, at a certain height
over private lands, has been legally designated by courts and lawmakers
as a public space since the advent of commercial aviation.41 Changes to
39 See e.g. Mitchell, supra note 27.
40 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property, (New York:
Routledge, 2004) at 5. Koops and Galič explain that geographers have shown that the
“division of the social world into public and private is not a natural division; rather it is an
expression of power” (Koops & Galič, supra note 28 at 20).
41 See e.g. Stuart Banner, Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace From the Wright
Brothers On (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Kevin Gray, “Property in Thin
Air” (1991) 50:2 Cambridge LJ 252; United States v Causby, 328 US 256 at 260–61 (1946)
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airspace property laws at that time — in response to the new transformative technology of piloted aviation — created a new public space. However,
this “public space” was not actually physically accessible by the majority of the public for most of aviation history. On-board piloted aircrafts
are expensive and complicated to operate, typically requiring significant
training and infrastructure. Relatively few individuals own or have easy
access to a personal aircraft. Commercial aviation is also expensive to
access, and access is typically mediated through private companies.42 It
has only recently become physically possible for members of the public to
have practical access to and the ability to use public airspace for a variety
of purposes. This access comes as a result of advances in drone technology
that have made aerial technology smaller, cheaper, and easier to operate,
especially relative to piloted aircrafts.43 Accordingly, airspace above a certain height44 is now both legally treated as a public space and is actually
accessible to the public. Drone technology has rendered public airspace
physically accessible to members of the public in new and practical ways.
This new reality has had an effect in shaping that space, and maybe
moreso, in shaping the laws that regulate that space. These laws in turn
have had a reciprocal effect on actual public access to and use of that public airspace. Paradoxically, as drone technology has made a public space
newly accessible to the public, regulations have had the effect of excluding
members of the public from that space in a number of ways, at least some
of which are especially problematic in light of the public status of that
space. Parts II and III, below, draw on the insights from law and geography
set out above, to reflect on what the public location of a robot should
mean for the regulation of robotic systems, and subsequently, what robot
regulations mean for the public nature of a space. The parts below also
expand on this example of drone regulation to illustrate how a regulator’s
vision of public space can affect the public’s experience of that space.

[Causby]; Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd, [1978] 1 QB 479 at 488B
[Bernstein], followed in Didow v Alberta Power Ltd, [1988] 88 AR 250, 5 WWR 606 (ABCA)
[Didow]; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, c 601, 52 Stat 973.
42 Thomasen, “Flying Between”, supra note 3 .
43 Ibid.
44 Landowners maintain a property interest in the airspace above their land, up to an uncertain height, “at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in
connection with the land”. See Causby, supra note 41 at 264; Didow, supra note 41 at paras
38–40 (adopting Causby and Bernstein). See also Gray, supra note 41.
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II. PUBLIC SPACE AND ROBOT REGULATION
A. Introduction
When commercial, government, or private operators propose to use a
robotic system in public space, how should location affect regulation?45
Laws that regulate or apply in public space are typically developed through
public authorities, and broadly speaking, are adopted in the public interest. However, a range of ideas about what the public interest is in public
space can influence how regulations eventually shape the use of, access to,
and conduct within a space, and can have the effect of prioritizing some
uses and users and marginalizing others. More specifically, a regulator’s
vision for public space can have different consequences for operators who
wish to deploy robotic systems in that space, and for other people who use
or rely on that space.
This section canvasses three examples of constructs of public space
held by common law courts and lawmakers — three different visions of
what public space is and why it matters. Drawing on law and geography’s
co-production of law and space theory, this section considers how these
different visions impact the occupants, design, and experience of these
spaces. A clearer understanding of the different values attributed to public
spaces — and how these values shape regulation — can help to reveal some
of the broader impacts of seemingly specific robotics regulations. Ultimately, by regulating (or not) the robots that operate in public space, regulators are implementing a vision of public space, regardless of whether this
was an explicit consideration in regulatory deliberations. The lawmaker’s
vision of public space, and the values they prioritize, should be made
explicit when debating new robotics regulations.
B. Different Visions of Public Space
1. Public Space as the Communal Public Square
A common vision of public space considers space to be a communal
site for interaction, expression, and sharing — a physical location of the

45 This is not unlike the question of how values and expectations of the private home can, or
should, influence the regulation of home robots; either directly or through laws of general
application. See Margot Kaminski, “Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?”
(2015) 51:3 Idaho L Rev 661; Margot Kaminski et al, “Averting Robot Eyes” (2017) 76:4 Md
L Rev 983.
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public sphere.46 Public spaces are where diverse members of the public
can co-exist; where individuals of distinct backgrounds and views can
come together.47 Public space is where individuals encounter difference,
and it accordingly must be structured in a way that permits difference to
be expressed.48 This view of public space calls for access to (and use of )
space by any and all members of the public, even where the differences
between individuals might create discomfort.49 In fact, such discomfort
from the exposure to difference is one of the core values of public space
according to this view.50
This vision of public space discourages regulations that limit the potential for human interaction — especially those that undermine the space as
one where individuals and communities encounter difference. As Blomley
explains, “the potential of public space can only be realized if it allows for
spontaneous and unprogrammed encounters with others.”51 Regulations
that explicitly or implicitly exclude specific members of the public or expressive uses of the space are to be avoided. Implicit exclusions might include
restrictions on conduct that are applicable predominantly to one group of
46 This vision of public space is many ways driven by Habermasian ideals. Habermas’ view
of the public sphere as a discursive space/community was not tied to specific property
or spaces. However, the ideals underlying the discursive public sphere have been echoed
in visions of public space and have informed judicial and academic perspectives on what
public spaces are meant to be like. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press 1989).
47 This view reflects that public spaces are public not simply because they are “publicly
owned”. Rather, they are spaces within which the “public sphere” is formed, policed, and
contested (Ruppert, supra note 27 at 273).
48 Ibid at 280. “If public space is where difference is encountered then it must be structured
in a manner that enables difference to be expressed and where particular conducts and
uses are not privileged above and beyond those of others” (ibid at 280). Blomley cites
Marshall Berman: “The glory of the modern public space is that it can pull together all the
different sorts of people who are there. It can compel and empower all these people to see
each other, not through a glass darkly, but face to face”. See Nicholas Blomley, “Begging
to Differ: Panhandling, Public Space, and Municipal Property” in Eric Tucker, James Muir
& Bruce Ziff, eds, Property On Trial: Canadian Cases in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law for the
Osgoode Society of Legal History, 2012) 393 at 407 [Blomley, “Begging to Differ”]. Public
space is a site where strangers can come together and encounter other people, meanings,
and ideas crucial to politics (ibid at 408).
49 See e.g. Mitchell, supra note 27; Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and Community” (2000)
50:4 UTLJ 371.
50 Ibid at 380. Waldron argues that encountering realities and lived experiences that make
the comfortable uncomfortable is what public space is all about. He argues it is a social
good to be challenged in our comfortable preconceptions.
51 Blomley, “Public Spaces”, supra note 32 at 4.
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individuals — especially when accompanied by surveillance and policing
to enforce these regulations — and justify the removal of these members
of the public. A number of authors, especially in law and geography, have
highlighted how public space regulations like these can serve to specifically
exclude individuals experiencing homelessness from public spaces.52 Conduct regulations can target other minority or vulnerable communities in a
similar way.53 Ultimately, approaching this view of public space through law
and geography theory encourages a largely unregulated, open, and accessible space for all members of the community. A version of this view arises
in some judicial reasoning, though often tempered, in relation to constitutional challenges to limits on free expression in public space.54
A “public sphere” view of public space — encouraging relatively
unregulated space — would probably not restrict users of robotic systems
from public, especially if those systems are used for expressive purposes
or permit physical access that would not otherwise be possible. But where
robots interfere with human interaction and spontaneity, one might
expect regulation or prohibition. An example of a rejection of a robotic
system that had the effect of marginalizing human occupants of public
space occurred recently in San Francisco. The Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) utilized a 400-pound Knightscope robot
surveillance system to discourage an encampment on public property
near its private property. The robot was used for, among other things,
52 Ibid; Mitchell, supra note 27; Layard, “Public Space”, supra note 29.
53 See Richard T Ford “Local Racisms and the Law: Introduction” in Blomley, Delaney &
Ford, supra note 12. “Spatial segregation has long been a means of perpetuating social
hierarchy” and “law is implicated in the creation and perpetuation of racially segregated
spaces” by requiring or prohibiting movement of individuals — to explicitly or implicity
segregate individuals (ibid at 52). See Legal Aid Ontario, “Racialization of Carding and
Street Checks” (2016), online (pdf): <legalaid.on.ca/strategic/wp-content/uploads/sites/
4/2016/06/infographic-RCS-carding-2016-05-EN.pdf> (statistics on the over-policing of
Black Canadians through random street checks and carding); Ontario Human Rights
Commission, “Under Suspicion: Research and Consultation Report on Racial Profiling in
Ontario” (2017), online: <ohrc.on.ca/en/under-suspicion-research-and-consultation-reportracial-profiling-ontario> (Ontario Human Rights Commission’s massive report on racial
profiling by police in Ontario).
54 See e.g. Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909 [Shantz]; Victoria City v Adams, 2008
BCSC 1363 [Adams, BCSC]; Victoria City v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563 [Adams, BCCA] (each
decided on section 7 grounds — the right to life, liberty, and security of the person);
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada, [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR (4th) 385
[Commonwealth]. But see Calgary Airport Authority v Canadian Centre for Bio-Ethical Reform,
2019 ABQB 29; Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62 (expression that is
compatible with the public space may be protected) [Montréal (City)].
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targeted exclusion of individuals experiencing homelessness from that
space. However, public protest against this use of the device ultimately
led the Department of Public Works in San Francisco to order the SPCA
to stop using the robot on public sidewalks, with threat of a $1000 fine for
every day the device operated on the sidewalk.55 A vision of public space
as a space for human occupants was maintained through regulation of the
use and presence of a robotic system.
2. Public Space as a Regulated and Orderly Public Square
Another vision of public space also views it as a communal space, but in
contrast to the first — which values difference and spontaneity — this view
values regulation to make the space appealing and enjoyable to the majority of potential users. According to this second view, for a space to serve its
communal public purpose, it requires careful regulation to ensure that it
is a desirable destination for members of the public.56 In practice, regulators do not usually adopt extreme versions of the first vision set out above;
that is, of a highly deregulated public space. Generally, some rules apply in
public space that dictate permissible conduct, things, and interactions in
that space. This vision of public space perceives that if public space is left
entirely unregulated, the chaos that will emerge will consequently exclude
members of the public from that space due to fear or concern about the
activities in that space.57 Many North American public spaces are shaped
by this vision.
55 See Sarah Buhr, “Security Robots Are Being Used to Ward Off San Francisco’s Homeless
Population” (13 December 2017), online: TechCrunch <techcrunch.com/2017/12/13/securityrobots-are-being-used-to-ward-off-san-franciscos-homeless-population>; CBC Radio, “As
It Happens: San Francisco SPCA Deployed This Security Robot to Chase Off Homeless
People” (14 December 2017), online: <cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-thursdayedition-1.4448373/san-francisco-spca-deployed-this-security-robot-to-chase-off-homelesspeople-1.4448376>.
56 The dichotomy between these first two views is fleshed out in a scholarly debate between
Robert Ellickson and Jeremy Waldron in relation to public space regulation. Ellickson is
concerned about the “tragedy of the agora” wherein people avoid public spaces that contain the markers of poverty, e.g. squeegeeing, panhandling, or graffiti. When people avoid
public space, the space loses its potential to allow for “public” interaction — abandon
public spaces for suburban malls. So Ellickson proposes greater regulation of activities in
public spaces. See Robert C Ellickson, “Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces:
Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning” (1996) 105 Yale LJ 1165 at 1174. Waldron raises a series of legal and ethical critiques of this vision (Waldron, supra note 49).
57 Blomley, “Public Space”, supra note 32 at 4 (summarizing the Ellickson, Waldron, and
Mitchell debate).
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A more extreme example of this approach is laid out by property
law scholar Robert Ellickson in his call for more extensive regulations
to improve the public nature of public spaces. Ellickson argues that “to
be truly public a space must be orderly enough to invite the entry of a
large majority of those who come to it.”58 As an example, he specifies that
“[j]ust as disruptive forces at a town meeting may lower citizen attendance,
chronic panhandlers, bench squatters and other disorderly people may
deter some citizens from gathering in the agora.”59 Ellickson’s argument
suggests that regulators need to curate public space in ways that not only
allow, but encourage the majority populations to use this space. Otherwise, the argument suggests, the majority of the population will migrate
to suburbs and shopping centres, and the value of public space as a space
for the public will be lost. The notion of regulating public space to encourage more members of the public to spend time there also finds support in
some of the famous literature regarding urban design and thriving cities.60
Advocates for a more open and egalitarian view of public space (e.g.
closer to the first vision, outlined above) have challenged Ellickson’s
approach — particularly with regard to the ethics of criminalizing the
activities of one group in order to make another, already more politically
powerful group, more comfortable.61 Nevertheless, this second view has
been adopted by lawmakers as well as courts when negotiating competing claims for the use of public space.62 For instance, in Batty v Toronto
58 Ellickson, supra note 56 at 1174 [emphasis in original]. Ellickson is particularly concerned
with targeting chronic street nuisance, e.g. someone acting in a way that “violates prevailing community standards of behaviour to the significant cumulative annoyance of persons
of ordinary sensibility who use the same spaces” (ibid at 1185).
59 Ibid at 1174.
60 See e.g. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books,
1992).
61 Blomley, “Public Space”, supra note 32 at 4; Waldron, supra note 49 at 387. Mitchell in Right
to the City, sees these laws as motivated not by an attempt to restore civility to public space,
but as driven by the “hellish logic” of globalization that, in the drive to attract global investment, compels cities to “clean up” their streets of the very people who are victims of the
new economy (Mitchell, supra note 27 at 175). A difficulty in challenging these regulations
is that though they regulate activities and uses of public space, they do not explicitly dictate
whether people can enter those spaces or not — it can be difficult to see the connection
between these regulations and the question of how “public” a space is until we look more
closely at law and geography (Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48).
62 In a recent case, an individual’s conduct in a public park led others to feel uncomfortable,
and ultimately led to his eviction. See Bracken v Niagara Parks Police, 2018 ONCA 261. The
individual could legitimately be excluded from the space because he was detracting from
its use as a space for others to enjoy.

297

298

Revue de droit d’Ottawa

•

51:2 | Ottawa Law Review

•

51:2

(City),63 a Canadian case arising in the context of the Occupy movement,
the court was asked to specifically consider who and what public space is
for, and what that means for permissible activities in public space.64 The
case involved an encampment in a public park run jointly by the City of
Toronto and a neighbouring church. The encampment was built as part
of the Occupy protest as a space to discuss and debate the values of the
Occupy movement — very much reflecting the values of public space as
set out by the “public square” vision of public space above.65 This case
emerged from a constitutional challenge to a trespass notice preventing
protesters from building shelters and remaining in the park overnight.
In his decision on the use of this space, Justice Brown determined that
the protest was in essence anti-communal because it excluded others from
their use and enjoyment of that space.66 It resulted in a loss of recreation
for neighbouring residents (e.g. dog walking, ultimate frisbee, strolling)
and opposition from local business owners concerned about loss of sales
due to members of the public avoiding the space.67 Conduct by one group
in public space that served to make others uncomfortable or unwilling to
use that space could justifiably be regulated because it undermined the
open nature of the space.68 This is an approach to balancing competing
interests in public space that specifically prioritizes the comfort and interests of the majority of people who would access the space.
63 2011 ONSC 6862 [Batty].
64 Justice Brown asks “How do we live together in a community? How do we share public
space?” (ibid at para 1).
65 See Margaret Kohn, “Privatization and Protest: Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Toronto, and the
Occupation of Public Space in a Democracy” (2013) 11:1 Perspectives on Politics 99 at 100.
66 Batty, supra note 63 at paras 12–15.
67 See e.g. ibid at para 41 (and throughout witness statements at paras 42–44); Kohn, supra
note 65 at 100. Recent social movements, including Occupy and the “Arab Spring”, have
reinvigorated debate about the political significance of public space. These movements
contradict those who have warned about the declining importance of public space. See
Dale Leorke, “The Struggle to Reclaim the City: An Interview with Michael Sorkin” (2015)
18:1 Space & Culture 98. Law professor Sarah E Hamill has argued that the focus in Batty
on residents and adjacent properties “gave those with adjacent property rights extra rights
in the park and thus added an element of inequality into the analysis”. See Sarah E Hamill,
“Private Rights to Public Property: The Evolution of Common Property in Canada” (2012)
58:2 McGill LJ 365 at 382. Namely, Brown J was concerned with the interests of private
property owners both as neighbours and as park users. This analysis goes beyond what was
necessary to assess the trespass claim, which should just be about Occupy’s use of the park.
68 Importantly, the decision did not turn on the fact that the City owned the space and could
do with it as it saw fit — this distinction is relevant in relation to the third vision below.
But, the Court does refer to it as City-owned space (Batty, supra note 63 at para 18).
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Surveillance robots, like those in the San Francisco example, would be
permissible by this view if these systems are used to ensure that spaces
are safe and orderly from the perspective of the majority of people who
wish to use those spaces. By contrast, noisy drones or obstructive sidewalk robots may be banned if they interfere with residents’ desires for
the space as, for instance, a place of respite or a place of expedient transport. This view could potentially justify the exclusion of robots that make
spaces more accessible, like telepresence robots, if these are perceived to
interfere with human enjoyment of the space.
Thus, while similar to the first vision above, this viewpoint of what
public space is — and who and what it is for — can result in different regulations of robots, robot users, and the individuals who encounter robots,
to the effect of making the space more or less accessible for some humans
than others. Critically, under the rubric of regulating robots this viewpoint could be used to justify racist, classist, gendered, or ableist exclusions from public space. Lawmakers should be explicit about the public
space values they prioritize in regulating robotic systems, to permit scrutiny of the impacts of what might be seemingly “neutral” robotics laws
(i.e. not framed as targeting specific communities, etc). For proponents of
this second vision, “law is a precondition for shared use” of public space;
whereas for proponents of the first, law is “potentially its undoing.”69 Critics of this second view are particularly cautious about how laws in public
space can act with greater force on vulnerable populations.
3. Public Space as State-Owned Property
A third way in which lawmakers and courts have understood public space
has been to view it not as a common space “owned” by the public, but
as a government-owned and operated property to be efficiently managed
by public officials. For regulators who adopt this vision, the expressive
and communal values of the space are often secondary to the effective
administration of the space for its particular goals or purposes, which are
determined by the government, not necessarily the public.
Blomely has explored how this vision of public space drives government regulation and judicial understandings of public sidewalks,70 citing

69 Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48 at 405 (summarizing Ellickson and Mitchell,
respectively).
70 Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48; Blomley, Rights of Passage, supra note 37.
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a Canadian case, Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC v Vancouver (City),71
as an example of this vision of public space. Federated involved a constitutional challenge to bylaws prohibiting “obstructive solicitation” (panhandling) on sidewalks in Vancouver.72 Blomley articulated the tension
between the different possible visions of public space that arose in that
challenge as follows:
For opponents and proponents of the bylaw beyond the state, the sidewalk
is the material manifestation of the public sphere, a site for democratic
dialogue, the production of citizenship, and the exercise of rights. The
sidewalk, therefore is to be understood as a public space. Conversely, for
the City (and, ultimately, the court), the sidewalk is municipal space, to
be governed according to a narrowly defined public interest, that being
understood as circulation.73

Federated addressed important questions about public space regulation.
The City made the case that the “paramount” purpose of the sidewalk is
orderly circulation,74 and panhandling is one example of an obstruction of
that purpose. The court agreed, and found that the conduct could therefore
be legitimately regulated, even though it has expressive value.75 The Supreme
Court of Canada has similarly held that picketing a highway is not compatible with the “principal function of the place, which is to provide smooth
flow of automobile traffic.”76 The Court has also held that expression will be
constitutionally protected in public space where it does not interfere with the
71 2002 BCSC 105 [Federated] (by-laws that prohibit panhandling at para 1). This was one in a
string of similar cases. See R v Banks, 2007 ONCA 19 (laws that prohibit panhandling and
squeegeeing); Adams, BCCA, supra note 54 (deals with camping on public property).
72 The parties challenging the bylaws took the first view described above. Some of the arguments in support of the bylaw, for instance from local businesses, took the second vision
of public space above — that it is a site for public activities, and panhandling should only
be regulated when it discourages members of the public from using the streets. Arguments
against the bylaw in Federated included that public space is a political site for expression
(including panhandling), and that the sidewalk “not only provided a site where the public
sphere can be found … [i]t was itself the site where the potential of the public sphere was
realized”. Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48 at 407–408.
73 Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48 at 394.
74 Federated, supra note 71 at para 141; Blomley, “Begging to Differ”, supra note 48 at 415.
75 Federated, supra note 71. Taylor J: “Activities, whether or not they engage forms of expression, are subordinate to the purpose of safe and efficient movement of pedestrians” (ibid
at para 158).
76 Commonwealth, supra note 54 at 157–58. Justice Lamer made clear the need to balance
the interest of the individual in expression with the interests of the state and society as
a whole: “the individual will only be free to communicate in a place owned by the state if
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function of that space.77 In making these assessments, the Court affirmed
the view that public space is a government-owned or operated property to
be administered by government authorities in accordance with its perceived
public function.78 In other words, roads are for driving, sidewalks are for
circulation of pedestrians between private properties, and neither is primarily designed for communal socializing, discussion, or protest.
This view of public space can justify permissive regulation of robotic
technologies that enhance the municipal goals for different public spaces.
Autonomous vehicles on roadways are an example of a robotic system
expected to enhance the efficiency of roads as a space for travel. An administrative view of public roadways would justify expanding the use of roads
by autonomous vehicles, even if this might affect the use of roads for other
non-transit related purposes, or if it might prioritize the use of the vehicle
over other forms of pedestrianism, like cycling, crossing unexpectedly, or
obstructive protest.79 In other words, it is justified even if such regulation and use of the roads might make the space less usable by the public
for other communal, social, or expressive purposes. Similarly, drones that
make use of airspace or sidewalk robots that use public sidewalks to deliver
items (already accepted functions of those spaces) and reduce congestion
on the roads — facilitating improved traffic flow — would fit well within
this vision, so long as these technologies do not otherwise interfere with
the smooth administration of the spaces where they operate.80 This third

77

78
79

80

the form of expression he uses is compatible with the principal function or intended purpose of that place” (ibid at 156).
Montréal (City), supra note 54. McLachlin CJ and Deschamps J: “[p]roperty may be private
or public. Public property is government-owned … The question here is whether [constitutional freedom of expression] protects not only what the appellants were doing, but
their right to do it in the place where they were doing it, namely a public street” [emphasis
in original] (ibid at para 61); “[s]ome areas of government-owned property have become
recognized as public spaces in which the public has a right to express itself ” (ibid at para
64); “[s]treets provide means of passing and accessing adjoining buildings. They also serve
as venues of public communication. However one defines their function, emitting noise
produced by sound equipment onto public streets seems not in itself to interfere with it”
(ibid at para 69). See also Shantz, supra note 54.
See e.g. Montréal (City), supra note 54 at para 64.
The prompt public and regulatory reaction to the Uber collision, cited above, suggests that
more explicit and transparent consideration of the competing values at issue when regulators permit vehicle testing on public roads could be both necessary and forthcoming.
Amazon and Google have made public proposals outlining a vision of horizontally stratified public airspace that could permit a variety of drone operations to occur simultaneously at different altitudes, facilitating much wider use of drones. See Amazon Prime Air,
“Determining Safe Access with a Best Equipped, Best-Served Model for Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems” (July 2015), online (pdf): <images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/G/
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vision of public space might be best exemplified through laws that permit the incorporation of robotic systems into smart city designs aimed
at improving the overall efficiency of urban space.81 Regulators adopting
this third view of public space will ultimately shape that space — its potential uses, and permissible social experiences within that space — through
law in accordance with a view that can lead to substantially different consequences for the space, and for robot regulation, than the two visions
described above.
01/112715/download/Amazon_Determining_Safe_Access_with_a_Best-Equipped_BestServed_Model_for_sUAS.pdf>; Amazon Prime Air, “Revising the Airspace Model for
the Safe Integration of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (July 2015), online (pdf ):
<images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/G/01/112715/download/Amazon_Revising_
the_Airspace_Model_for_the_Safe_Integration_of_sUAS.pdf>; Wing, “Transforming
the Way Goods Are Transported”, online: <x.company/wing>. Municipal or local drone
ordinances have also been suggested to permit greater local control over where and when
drones can fly. See Troy A Rule, “Drone Zoning” (2016) 95:1 North Carolina LR 133; Troy
A Rule, “Airspace in an Age of Drones” (2015) 95:1 BUL Rev 155. But see Bradley L Garrett
and Adam Fish, “Attack on the Drones: The Creeping Privatisation of Our Urban Airspace”, The Guardian (12 December 2016), online: <theguardian.com/cities/2016/dec/12/
attack-drones-privatisation-urban-airspace>.
81 For instance, Sidewalk Toronto has involved this sort of planning. The project plan
dubbed the “Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP)” was submitted on June 17,
2019, and later unveiled to the public. It involves mapping out the physical infrastructure
(volume 1), integrating innovation with mobility and sustainable practices (volume 2), and
a final volume on building partnerships. See Daniel L Doctoroff, Sidewalk Labs (17 October
2017), online (pdf): < storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/13210553/Sidewalk-Labs-Vision-Sections-of-RFP-Submission.pdf >. See also Waterfront Toronto, “Innovation and Funding Partner Framework Agreement: Summary of Key
Terms for Public Disclosure” (1 November 2017), online (pdf): <torage.googleapis.com/
sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13214325/Waterfront-Toronto-AgreementSummary.pdf>; Quayside, “Sidewalk Lab’s Proposal: Master Innovation and Development
Plan”, online: <quaysideto.ca/sidewalk-labs-proposal-master-innovation-and-developmentplan>. This implementation process, at least to date, has occurred despite public concerns
over lack of transparency in the process. Critics who have reviewed the MIDP have raised
concerns about its data privacy policies and corporate overreach. See Mariana Valverde,
“The Controversy Over Google’s Futuristic Plans for Toronto”, The Toronto Star (31 January 2018), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/01/31/the-controversyover-googles-futuristic-plans-for-toronto.html>; Kirsten Fenn, “Sidewalk Lab’s $1.3B Plan
for Toronto’s Waterfront is Bad for Democracy, Critic Says”, CBC (25 June 2019), online:
<cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-25-2019-1.5188733/sidewalk-labs-1-3b-planfor-toronto-s-waterfront-is-bad-for-democracy-critic-says-1.5188753>; Geoff Zochodne
and James McLeod, “Five Potential Sticking Points in Sidewalk Labs’ Masterplan for the
Toronto Waterfront”, Financial Post (24 June 2019), online: <business.financialpost.com/
technology/embargo-2pm-five-sticking-points-in-sidewalk-labs-masterplan-for-the-torontowaterfront>.
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The impact of the lawmaker’s vision of public space on regulation in
that space, and the resulting impact on the public nature of that space, can
be illustrated again with the drone regulation example introduced in Part
I. If one is interested in the role of public airspace as a public space, law
and geography tells us that it is necessary to consider not only the legal
designation of the space (which has been public since the emergence of
commercial aviation) and public access to that space (which is increasingly feasible due to remotely operated robotic technologies), but also the
effects of laws that regulate conduct within that space. Airspace is heavily
regulated to ensure its safety and efficiency. A range of drone laws control
access to (and use of) this space, and have made the space easier to access
for some members of the public compared to others.82
Recent examples of the regulation of public airspace, in ways that
deeply engage its public status, have centered around drone use in the
context of protest. In 2014, the FAA imposed flight restrictions following
the use of a drone over a Black Lives Matter protest in Ferguson, Missouri;83 and again in 2016, following a drone flight over No Dakota Access
Pipeline (NoDAPL) protests at the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe lands.84
In the latter example, the operator of the drone — Aaron Turgeon, an
Indigenous citizen journalist — used the technology to capture video evidence of police brutality against protesters.85 Police shot at the drone, and
82 For example, commercial operators in Canada and the US had long been subject to stricter
regulation than recreational operators, though this has recently changed in Canada where
regulation now primarily depends on the size of the drone and where it is being flown.
83 See American Civil Liberties Union, “Letter From Anthony E Rothert and Lee Rowland to
Reggie Govan” (4 November 2014), online (pdf): <aclu.org/other/aclu-letter-faa-protestingno-fly-zone-media-ferguson>.
84 See Vera Eidelman, “FAA Helps Police Suppress Reporting From Dakota Pipeline Protests”
(19 December 2016), online: <aclu.org/blog/free-future/faa-helps-police-suppress-reportingdakota-pipeline-protests>. Notably, this example at the NoDAPL protests is not over an
urban space, which is the focus of this paper. Nevertheless, this example demonstrates
some of the challenges with the regulation of robotic systems in public spaces, which
affect or undermine the public nature of that space — which could and likely will extend to
urban spaces too, especially as the technology becomes safer and more acceptable to fly in
cities and over crowds.
85 See Saba Hamedy, “Drone Footage Shows Recent Clashes At #NoDAPL Protest in Standing Rock”, Mashable (27 November 2016), online: <mashable.com/2016/11/27/standing-rockno-dapl-protest-drone-footage/#gbqROX.UuSqs>. See also “Drone Footage Captures
Scene at Standing Rock”, NBC News (25 November 2016), online (video): <nbcnews.com/
video/drone-footage-captures-scene-at-standing-rock-817789507848> (showing the size
of the gathering despite freezing weather). Aaron Turgeon, “Biography: If We Don't Stand,
Who Will?”, online (blog): Prolific the Rapper <prolifictherapper.com/bio>.
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charged Turgeon with reckless endangerment.86 These charges were later
dismissed in court.87 The FAA also imposed a temporary no-fly zone over
the area, preventing members of the public from making further use of
the airspace above the protests.88 However, police-operated drones were
still permitted at the site of the protests.89 The FAA did permit journalists
to apply for exceptions to the ban. Only one exemption was granted, to a
non-Indigenous non-local journalist.90
The framework set out in Parts I and II above, can help unpack some of
the legal and spatial implications of this drone regulation. First, the public
use of airspace, despite its legal status as a public space and its physical
accessibility, was tightly restricted through technology-specific drone
regulation. The no-fly regulation had the effect of rendering the space
less (or not) public, despite the space being legally designated as a public space. The FAA clearly was not operating from either of the first two
visions of public space. Drone regulations in Canada and the US are not
aimed at making public airspace accessible or more appealing to potential
users of that space — at least not predominantly. Rather, drone regulations
86 See Jason Koebler, “Drone Journalist Faces 7 Years in Prison for Filming Dakota Pipeline
Protests”, Motherboard/VICE Media (25 May 2017), online: <motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
article/zmbdy5/drone-journalist-faces-7-years-in-prison-for-filming-north-dakota-accesspipeline-protests>.
87 The court found that video evidence demonstrated that Turgeon had not flown the drone
in a dangerous manner. See Caroline Grueskin, “Charges Dismissed Against Drone Operator Who Documented Protests”, Bismarck Tribune (10 July 2017), online :
<bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/charges-dismissed-against-droneoperator-who-documented-protests/article_d130c5d3-4fbe-5892-bc3e-b38de4717dfb.html;
Caroline Grueskin, “Drone and Cell Phone Footage Lead to Acquittal in Protest Case”,
Bismarck Tribune (25 May 2017), online: <bismarcktribune.com/drone-and-cell-phone-footage-lead-to-acquittal-in-protest/article_6716eb9b-64e9-5cc3-a453-3b5bf517ae89.html>.
88 See Jason Koebler, “The Government is Using a No Fly Zone to Suppress Journalism at Standing Rock”, Motherboard/VICE Media (30 November 2016), online: <motherboard.vice.com/
read/the-government-is-using-a-no-fly-zone-to-suppress-journalism-at-standing-rock>.
89 Police are often permitted to carry and use tools and weapons in ways that civilians are
not, so it may seem uncontroversial that the same distinction would apply in this case
with drones. However, there are at least two relevant distinctions here: first, drone technology is the means of accessing this public space, so by permitting police access, but
denying citizen access, the flight restriction has the effect of excluding one group of individuals all-together. This is also not in itself unique to this situation. However, building
on this first point, the exclusion of public use of the airspace here arose specifically after
that use of airspace had the effect of making alleged police abuse of power transparent to
the public. The power imbalance in this case between the protesters and law enforcement,
and the manner in which it was reinforced through the flight ban (whether intentional or
not), is, to put it lightly, troubling.
90 Koebler, supra note 88.
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are designed to ensure the efficiency and safety of airspace, particularly in
relation to commercial aviation.91
While the no-fly regulation was adopted out of a concern for the safety
of airspace users (e.g. police operated planes) and people on the ground
below, this regulation also does not align well with the administrative view
of public airspace.92 The FAA was not opposed to the use of drones in that
particular airspace. It specifically prohibited access by particular individuals. Meanwhile others (police and one journalist) could carry out the same
activity, suggesting that the activity itself did not inherently interfere with
the efficient administration of airspace. This example also undermines the
first two visions of public space as a communal, democratic space. Using
technology in public space to gather information of public interest — and
which notably proved to be significant to the public’s later reaction to the
events at Standing Rock — sits squarely within the notion of public space
as a democratic space.
In this case, instead of being informed by the public nature of the airspace over the protests, the regulations can be said to at least implicitly
portray the exertion of power to permit differential access to (and use of )
space. Problematically, this approach had the effect of altogether undermining the public nature of this space for some members of the public
who relied on it. Drawing on the discussions in Parts I and II, the legitimacy or justification of the temporary flight restrictions may be challenged
as an illegitimate reshaping of a space that is legally meant for the public;
rather than solely as a safety measure as they were portrayed.
This example presents some further lessons. First, it demonstrates how
the regulation of a thing in public space might have broader implications
for the public’s access to and use of that space. Understanding this effect
will be particularly relevant in contexts where robotic technologies — particularly by virtue of their dislocation from the human operator — make
public spaces newly accessible to members of the public. If a remotely
operated robotic device stands in as a member of the public making use of
a public space, regulators should give special consideration to how regulation of that device affects access. Second, this example reminds us that
91 See e.g. Transport Canada, “About Transport Canada — Corporate Information” (8 August
2019), online: <tc.gc.ca/eng/aboutus-department-overview.htm>.
92 The FAA statement is reproduced in John Goglia, “Flight Restrictions Over Standing Rock:
Is the FAA Effectively Taking Sides in Pipeline Dispute?”, Forbes (27 November 2016),
online: <forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2016/11/27/flight-restrictions-over-standing-rock-isthe-faa-effectively-taking-sides-in-pipeline-dispute/#3e481a0e734c>.
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even where a regulation amounts to administering a public space, that
administration might have the effect of undermining the public nature
of that space. This might arguably, and paradoxically, undermine the very
justification for the public authority to be administering that space in the
first place. Regulators should explicitly consider the impact of a regulation
on access to and use of the space where it applies. Transparency about
this assessment may encourage the adoption of different or better regulations, and would at least give the public an opportunity to question and
challenge the legitimacy of the regulation, whether through consultation,
court, or public complaint. Furthermore, this example in particular highlights the ongoing colonial impact of US law, which can of course be replicated in robot-specific regulation and should be forefront in decisions like
this one by the FAA.
C. Conclusion
Law and geography helps to show how the public nature of space shapes
how lawmakers approach regulation of robots in that space. Different
visions of what public space is, and who and what it is for, can be called
upon to justify different forms of robot regulation — either by law- and
policy-makers, companies lobbying for permissive regulations, or the public who will be impacted by robotic systems in public space. Importantly,
the resulting regulations can then have the effect of rendering a public
space more or less public for the individuals who access and use that
space. These three examples above are by no means exhaustive, but are
predominant both in law and academia.93
III. HOW SHOULD PUBLIC SPACE ROBOTS BE REGULATED?
A. Introduction
The preceding two Parts have: (a) discussed how robots and the laws
that regulate them can shape the public nature of a public space;94 and
(b) examined how different legal visions of a space as “public” can result
93 This conversation can be expanded through exploration of what other visions of public
space, including Indigenous legal orders, tell us about robots, regulation, and shared
spaces.
94 Recall, a public space is created through a legal designation as public, signalling the public’s right to be in that space, through the public’s ability to actually access that space, and
through the laws that regulate the public’s use of that space.
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in different regulation of things, conduct, and people in that space, which
in turn co-constitutes how public that space will be for different members of the public.95 Revealing this process can help to make some of the
trade-offs and priorities embedded in robot regulations more visible, and
more debateable. The above sections already cited some examples of how
robots and regulation will be affected by the relationships between law
and public space. This Part takes this analysis a step further, examining
how regulators should approach the task of regulating public space robots.
If we accept that robots, and the laws that regulate them, their operators, and the people who encounter them, can change the public nature
of public space — making it potentially less or more public to people in
that space — then it should be crucial that lawmakers consider this impact
when regulating. Different visions of legal space are based on different
reasons for why that space matters, including to cultivate community,
sociality, equality, expression, efficiency, movement between private
spaces, commerce, etc. If we envision public space as playing an important
function in community building, social lives, and expression, then regulators and regulations need to prioritize these values. If we believe that public space must be equitable in order to attain its social function, as many
of the authors cited above have argued, then we must expose and critique
the inequitable impacts of robot regulation that will affect people in this
space. A lawmaker guided solely by the fact that a system is operating
in public could develop various approaches to regulating, depending on
which vision of public space guides them. Drawing from the above discussion and examples of robots in public spaces, the next two sub-sections
outline two basic principles that I argue should inform the regulation of
robots in public spaces, in order to prioritize and maintain values like
community, sociality, and equitable access.96
95 Part II specifically explored how regulations that apply within a public space can, and
should, be influenced by the public nature of that space (its legal designation). Since these
regulations will shape the public nature of the space, only regulations that align with the
public nature of space should be justifiable. This can, of course, mean different things,
depending on how one understands the public nature of a space, and does not mean that
one kind of regulation is necessary. Developing the most appropriate regulations will
require consideration of the impact of the regulation to ensure that space remains accessible and usable by the public in an equitable way. In cases where the law has undermined
the public nature of the space, then one might question the appropriateness/legitimacy of
that regulation for that space.
96 Layard, “Public Space”, supra note 29 at 2–3 (discusses these values as some examples for
why public space matters). See also Hamill, supra note 67.
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B. Robots and Regulations That Exclude People or Conduct From
Public Spaces
The first two visions of public space share in common a viewpoint that
public space is a communal space; with divergence over how this communal space should be regulated to appease the interests of the majority, or to preserve the inclusion of difference.97 These are not inherently
mutually exclusive objectives, but as explained in the examples above,
sometimes they are and when in conflict will lead to different approaches
to regulation. Problematically, as emphasized by several law and geography scholars, the second view can be used to justify the exclusion or
further marginalization of already vulnerable users of public space. When
regulators are considering the addition of a robotic system into a space,
this application of the second view must be explicitly avoided to preserve,
to the extent possible, values like community, sociality, and expression.
Robotic systems should never be prioritized over human access to public
spaces. Where the introduction of robotic systems in public space requires
targeted legislation that excludes, or more likely has the effect of excluding
people from that space, the system should not be introduced.
As anthropologists Sally Applin and Michael Fischer have argued, regulators (and societies more generally) cannot simply assume that robots
will be smoothly introduced into the socio-technical landscape of public
spaces.98 In fact, robots that operate in complex urban settings will demand
much cooperation and labour from individuals who interact with the technology; whether that individual benefits in any way from the presence of
the robotic system or not. In an article drawing from this research, Applin
discusses the example of sidewalk delivery robots, designed to carry food
and small items to customers by driving along public sidewalks. These
robots will have to navigate around other users of the sidewalks: they may
have to stop suddenly; become immobilised; or require the assistance
97 This is, of course, an oversimplification of how regulators actually assess policy decisions,
but it is helpful to make this distinction clear to reveal the impact of different regulatory
and policy decisions.
98 Sally A Applin & Michael D Fischer, “New Technologies and Mixed-Use Convergence:
How Humans and Algorithms Are Adapting to Each Other” (Paper delivered at IEEE
International Symposium on Technology & Society, Dublin, 11 November 2015), (2016)
IEEE ISTAS 1 at 1–6; Sally A Applin, “Delivery Robots Will Rely on Human Kindness and
Labour”, Motherboard/VICE Media (8 May 2018), online: <vice.com/en_us/article/ne98x7/
delivery-robots-will-rely-on-human-kindness-and-labor> (where the author applies the
lessons from her paper specifically to the case of sidewalk delivery robots).
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of a passerby to become dislodged from an obstacle. The existing built
environment is not designed for these devices. For example, they cannot
open doors and may have to rely on the labour of passersby to do so. The
devices are also not inherently designed for a human accessible environment. Recent examples emphasize the ways in which these devices become
a sometimes dangerous barrier to human users of the sidewalk.99 Accordingly, all of these challenges demand cooperation, accommodation, or concession from the human users of city sidewalks. These demands detract
from the experience of public space and in some cases from the safety of
public space.100 But even more concerningly, these demands may pressure
lawmakers to regulate sidewalks in order to accommodate the technology.
Activities like loitering on sidewalks could foreseeably be prohibited in the
interest of preventing a robotic mishap. Such a regulatory approach would
have the effect, if not intention, of targeting individuals who engage in
these activities for surveillance, policing, and removal — effectively undermining the public nature of that sidewalk for them, in favour a robotic
system and the corporate interests behind that system.
Sidewalk robots have been permitted in a number of US cities. A notable contrast occurred in San Francisco, where the city imposed limitations
on the use of sidewalk robots. In part, the limitation was justified on the
basis of protecting public space from encroachment by private companies.101 All sidewalk delivery robots now require prior permission in the
form of a permit before utilizing public sidewalks. San Francisco recently
approved the first delivery robot permit.102
As discussed above, another example of a rejection of a robotic system
is, of course, the San Francisco SPCA’s use of a surveillance robot to discourage an encampment on public property near its private property. The
second vision of public space, as iterated in Batty, might suggest that this
would be a permissible use of the system. For instance, in this view, local
99 See Emily Ackerman, “My Fight with a Sidewalk Robot: A Life-Threatening Encounter with
AI Technology Convinced Me That the Needs of People with Disabilities Need to be Engineered into our Autonomous Future” (19 November 2019), online: CityLab <citylab.com/
perspective/2019/11/autonomous-technology-ai-robot-delivery-disability-rights/602209/>.
100 Ibid.
101 Adam Brinklow, “San Francisco Bans Robots From Most Sidewalks” (6 December 2017),
online: Curbed San Francisco <sf.curbed.com/2017/12/6/16743326/san-francisco-deliveryrobot-ban>.
102 Kate Clark, “Postmates Lands First-Ever Permit to Test Sidewalk Delivery Robots in San
Francisco” (7 August 2019), online: TechCrunch <techcrunch.com/2019/08/07/postmateslands-first-ever-permit-to-test-sidewalk-delivery-robots-in-san-francisco>.
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residents would have an interest in keeping the sidewalks and spaces near
their private places clear and comfortable for patrons. However, such an
approach would again have the effect of prioritizing the use of a robotic
system over the access and use of a public space by members of the public.
Such an approach should be, and as was in this case, rejected.103
C. Regulating Robots That Facilitate Access to Public Space
The third vision of public space approaches regulation from the perspective of the goals and interests of the government as “owner” of the public
space. Again, this viewpoint is not inherently in conflict with the first two.
But where a government goal overrides the public’s interest in a use of the
space, that public interest might be regulated against (where holders of
the first and second viewpoint might not regulate in such a way).
Law Professor Sarah Hamill has argued that this government-ownership approach to public spaces is problematic.104 It reflects an assumption
that all spaces fit within a private-property model, with the government
serving as the property owner. This model emphasizes the rights of
owners over all other rights and interests in that space, prioritizing the
government’s management of the space “rather than the public’s benefit
from common property.”105 She argues the key feature of public space is
the public’s relationship with that space.106 She helpfully frames why public space is unique, compared to privately-owned property, and should not
simply be treated as a state-owned property:
It is important that [common] property is recognized as a distinct form
of property because it provides a contrast to private property’s vision of
property. Common property necessarily requires us to pay attention to
how others might need to use such property and it forces us to pay attention to others in ways that private property does not.107
103 Buhr, supra note 55; CBC Radio, supra note 55.
104 Supra note 67.
105 “The question of ownership of common property is much more complex than ownership
of private property because whatever rights there are to common property, they are shared
among the population and between the public and the government. Rather than struggle
with the complexity of common property, Canadian courts have sought to simplify the
issue and force all forms of property into a private property model” (Hamill, supra note 67
at 368).
106 “It is not the owner of the property that is the key differentiation of property, but the public’s relationship with that property” (Hamill, supra note 67 at 399).
107 Hamill, supra note 67 at 403 [emphasis added].

Robots, Regulation, and the Changing Nature of Public Space

Robotic technologies can be used to improve physical access to public
space by members of the public, enlivening Hamill’s description of public
space as a communal space. Several examples in the Introduction describe
how robotic systems can improve the physical accessibility of and remove
barriers to public spaces. Some particular features of robotic systems,
like remote operability and automation of decision-making, allow access
to otherwise hard to reach spaces (e.g. airspace) and allow new ways of
accessing space (e.g. automated driving that does not require certain
human inputs). The use of such technologies can mean that a space that
is legally designated as public can become more public through access and
subsequent use of that space. Where a robotic system makes a space more
accessible, differential regulation of the access and use of the space through
that technology should be avoided.108 The drone regulation example cited
above highlights this concern. It is one thing to regulate a public space
for government goals, but as discussed in the critiques cited above, this
approach becomes particularly problematic when regulators explicitly
exclude certain members of the public through differential regulation
of the technology — especially when individuals seek to use the space for
expressive purposes. The inequitable impact of this approach to regulation could be hidden behind laws that appear to only relate to objects in
a given space.
Canadian constitutional law requires that a regulation that impedes
expression have a lawful justification. Precedent in Canada cited throughout this paper suggests that regulating a space for efficiency or safety could
fulfill that justification. However, regulators and courts should be particularly cautious where the use of a robotic system to access a space is permitted for some individuals and not others — particularly where those others
108 Where a robotic system permits remote access to a public space, but in doing so might
have the effect of excluding human access to that same space, there may be a perceived
conflict between these principles. However, this second principle relates in particular to
cases where regulation leads to differential access or use of the space: some people gain
access through a robotic system that others cannot benefit from (like the drone example
in Part II). So, it is possible that a perceived conflict would not amount to a real conflict
between these two principles. Nevertheless, sometimes they will be in conflict. In such a
case, broader social questions need to be raised. Why is the space so differentially physically inaccessible that some, though not all, people need to rely on a robotic system just to
access it? Is there a broader systemic issue here that must be addressed, where the use of a
robotic system is simply a stop-gap measure? In such cases, some compromise might need
to be struck between these two principles. However, even in such a situation, permissive
regulation of a robotic system should not be used as a mechanism to avoid dealing with
broader systemic problems, and should be at most temporary, if even necessary.
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seek to exert their constitutional rights, including to free expression. The
constitutional arguments against such a restriction are beyond the scope
of this paper, but should include a consideration of how the robotic system
serves to make a space public (or not), whether the regulation of that system results in inequality, and how regulation of that system amounts to a
regulation of public space, and potentially, expression. Beyond expression,
public space values like community and sociality might not benefit from
the same constitutional protection. However, if these values are to be protected in public space, then lawmakers must at least avoid legislating differential access to and use of technology that makes space accessible, and
must be explicit about the values and ends that are being prioritized (and
those that are not) in order to permit public scrutiny and debate.
CONCLUSION
Public space is a complicated socio-legal concept. As legal geographers have
demonstrated, a legal definition is only one of several factors that combine
to render a space public or not. Whether members of the public can access
this space, and how conduct within that space is regulated, also contribute
to its public nature. This paper has considered the impact that robots and
robot regulation will have on the public nature of public spaces. This paper
has emphasized why lawmakers need to be careful and explicit about how
they regulate robotic systems that operate in public spaces. By regulating
robots, lawmakers may also be implementing a particular vision of public
space that renders that space more or less public to different individuals
and communities. This paper has identified two principles that can help
guide the regulation of public space robotics. First, the entry of a robotic
system into a public space should never be prioritized over human access
to (and use of) that space. Second, where a robotic system serves to make
a space more accessible, lawmakers should be cautious to avoid providing
differential access to that space through the regulation of that robotic system. Foundationally, lawmakers should resist any arguments by users or
manufacturers of robotic systems that public space, by virtue of its public
nature, should be freely available for the use and training of robots. Such an
approach threatens to privatize and commercialize public spaces in ways
that would exclude people, and would entirely overlook the already exclusionary impact of the colonial laws and systems operating in these spaces.

